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This paper critically reviews the draft of the Office of Management and Budget’s eighth 
report on the benefits and costs of federal regulation. The draft report offers two modest 
improvements over previous reports. First, it discusses the importance of information quality in 
regulatory analyses and the agencies’ implementation of the Information Quality Act. Second, it 
compares ex ante benefit-cost estimates with ex post benefit-cost estimates in some detail.  
 
While there has been progress, there is room for significant improvement. We offer seven 
recommendations—six for OMB and one for Congress—that would help hold lawmakers and 
regulators more accountable for the regulations they produce. Our recommendations focus on 
getting the regulatory agencies to produce better analysis, making that analysis more transparent 
and readily available, and making the regulatory process itself more transparent.   
 
We recommend that OMB: 
 
•  examine the extent to which regulations maximize net benefits; 
•  include a scorecard showing the number and percentage of final regulations that pass a 
benefit-cost test based on factors that can be quantified and monetized; 
•  request that all agencies report on the extent to which they comply with OMB’s 
guidelines for conducting regulatory analysis;  
•  provide guidelines for assessing the effectiveness of antiterrorism regulations; 
•  include a discussion of the costs and benefits of antitrust activities in its annual report; 
and 
•  facilitate the use of information markets to increase overall economic efficiency and to 
inform regulatory decision making 
 
We also recommend that Congress require all agencies to comply with OMB’s guidelines 




   
 
An Analysis of the Eighth Government Report On the Costs and Benefits of Federal 
Regulations 
          




The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has just released a draft of its eighth 
annual report to Congress on the costs and benefits of federal regulation.
1  The law requires that 
OMB submit a report to Congress that provides estimates of the costs and benefits of federal 
regulation. The report is also supposed to make recommendations for reform, provide guidelines 
for agencies to standardize benefit and cost estimates, and assess the impact of federal regulation 
on State and local government, small business, wages and economic growth.
2   
The 2005 OMB draft report offers two modest improvements over previous reports.
3 
First, OMB discusses the importance of information quality in regulatory analyses and the 
agencies’ implementation of the Information Quality Act.
4 The Act requires OMB to develop 
government-wide standards “for ensuring and maximizing” the quality of information 
disseminated by Federal agencies.
5  Second, OMB compares ex ante benefit-cost estimates with 
ex post benefit-cost estimates for some regulations. While an ex post analysis can yield 
important insights about the accuracy of an ax ante regulatory analysis, it also has shortcomings 
that OMB should describe.   
                                                           
1 OMB (2005).  
2 The FY2001 Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act, § 624 (a) requires OMB to submit an 
“accounting statement and associated report” containing: “(1) an estimate of the total annual costs and benefits 
(including quantifiable and non-quantifiable effects) of Federal rules and paperwork, to the extent feasible: (A) in 
the aggregate; (B) by agency and agency program; and (C) by major rule; (2) an analysis of impacts of Federal 
regulation on State, local, and tribal government, small business, wages, and economic growth; and (3) 
recommendations for reform.”  Unlike reports from the past three years, this year’s report does not address impacts 
of federal regulation on state, local, and tribal governments, small business, wages, and economic growth. The 
FY2001 Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act, § 624 (c) requires OMB to “issue guidelines to 
agencies to standardize: (1) measures of costs and benefits; and (2) the format of accounting statements.”         
3 Although the report is published in the Federal Register by OMB, the particular office within the Office of 
Management that is responsible for reviewing rules submitted by agencies, issuing information quality guidelines, 
issuing prompt letters, and enforcing Executive Order 12,866 is the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs  
(OIRA). See Office of Management and Budget, OIRA Q&A’s. Available: 
 http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/qa_2-25-02.pdf (last visited March 23, 2004).  
4 Section 515 of the Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act, 2001 (Public Law 106-554, 31 U.S.C. 
3516 note) is commonly known as the Information Quality Act.  
5 OMB (2005), at 45.  2 
   
 
Notwithstanding these two improvements, OMB has failed to address the most serious 
problems with agencies’ regulatory analyses. Our seven recommendations—six for OMB and 
one for Congress—for Congress would help address these core issues.  
We recommend that OMB: examine the extent to which regulations maximize net 
benefits; include a scorecard showing the number and percentage of final regulations that pass a 
benefit-cost test; request that all agencies report on the extent to which they comply with OMB’s 
guidelines for conducting regulatory analysis; provide guidelines for assessing the effectiveness 
of antiterrorism regulations; include a discussion of the costs and benefits of antitrust activities in 
its annual report; and facilitate the use of information markets to increase overall economic 
efficiency and to inform regulatory decision making.  
Requiring agencies to comply with OMB’s guidelines has been unsuccessful. The 
guidelines have little value if they are not seriously enforced. We recommend that Congress 
require all agencies to comply with OMB’s guidelines for conducting regulatory analysis.
6  
  Section 2 identifies improvements in the report. Section 3 offers recommendations for 
improving OMB’s report and regulatory oversight function. Section 4 presents our conclusions. 
 
2. Improvements in OMB’s Report 
 
In its discussion of the Information Quality Act, OMB discloses the number of public 
requests to correct information by agency, revealing that most requests were rejected. OMB also 
discusses public misperceptions of the Act. While this overview is informative, it is not clear 
how this knowledge can improve regulatory decisions.  
OMB should try to quantify the impact of the Information Quality Act on regulatory 
outcomes.
7 As a first step, OMB could determine how many information correction requests 
pertained to problems in a regulatory impact analysis. It could also describe how an agency 
responded to such a request, and whether this response improved the quality of benefit and cost 
estimates. Although it may be premature to ask OMB to provide this data, it should begin 
developing a method for assessing impacts. Alternatively, if OMB believes that the Information 
                                                           
6 All agencies include both executive and independent agencies.  
7 The stated objective of the Information Quality Act is to improve the quality of information disseminated by the 
federal government, including regulatory analyses. See OMB (2005), at 45: “‘Information’ is defined as ‘any 3 
   
 
Quality Act is unlikely to have a significant impact on the quality of benefit and cost estimates 
contained in RIAs or the quality of regulatory decisions, it should say so.
8  
Another improvement in this year’s draft report is OMB’s comparison of ex ante benefit-
cost estimates with ex post benefit-cost estimates. Comparing benefit-cost estimates before a 
regulation was implemented with estimates several years after implementation is worthwhile, but 
OMB should explain that neither measure of benefits and costs is completely accurate.
9 Even 
when ex post estimates are done, they may be subject to great uncertainty. In the best of all 
worlds, we would prefer to know the “truth” on benefits and costs, assuming truth exists. The 
next best alternative might be to have an unbiased estimate of the economic impact of a 
regulation as it was implemented. The next best after that might be to have an unbiased estimate 
of the economic impact of a regulation before it was implemented.  
 
3. Recommendations   
 
While OMB has addressed a few key issues in this report, there is significant room for 
improvement. We offer seven recommendations aimed at improving the OMB report and the 
regulatory process.  
 
Recommendation 1: OMB should add a discussion in its report that assesses the extent to 
which the regulations under consideration maximize net benefits. 
 
Both executive orders 12866 and 12291 require selecting regulatory proposals that would 
maximize net benefits.
10 We think it is important to compare the regulatory proposal that is 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
communication or representation of knowledge such as facts or data’ in any medium, including information related 
to regulatory, statistical, research, and benefits programs.”  
8 If the Information Quality Act does not improve the quality of regulatory analysis or regulatory decision-making, 
then OMB should describe the actual rationale for the Act. If dissemination of higher quality information to 
interested parties is the primary objective, then OMB should say so in its annual report.  
9 For a discussion of potential problems and uncertainties in comparing ex ante and ex post estimates, see Winston 
Harrington, Richard Morgenstern, and Peter Nelson, On the Accuracy of Regulatory Cost Estimates, Resources for 
the Future (January, 1999): (“…credible ex ante/ex post comparisons cannot be made if the relevant studies don’t 
include the same components or don’t refer to the same cost concepts.”)   
10 See Clinton (1993), §1: “…in choosing among alternative regulatory approaches, agencies should select those 
approaches that maximize net benefits (including potential economic, environmental, public health and safety, and 
other advantages; distributive impacts; and equity), unless a statute requires another approach.” See also Reagan 
(1981), §2(c): “Regulatory objectives shall be chosen to maximize the net benefits to society.”  4 
   
 
selected with a proposal that would have maximized net benefits. OMB could then develop 
estimates, based on an agency’s regulatory analysis, of the extent to which proposals selected fell 
short of maximizing expected net benefits. 
To our knowledge, OMB has not addressed this issue, and we believe it is a good time to 
do so. While there may be analytical challenges in accomplishing this task, they are 
surmountable. Initially, the regulatory agencies should identify the alternative (or alternatives) 
that maximize expected net benefits, subject to being legal. They should then quantify those net 
benefits to the extent reasonable. In addition, they should also explain why those alternatives are 
not selected in cases where they are not selected. OMB could then offer an additional descriptive 
statistic for each regulation it reviews that would be useful for measuring the efficiency of the 
regulatory process. This statistic would be an estimate of the extent to which quantifiable net 
benefits of the proposal fall short of maximum feasible net benefits. 
In future work, OMB may want to ask the agencies to furnish an additional calculation 
that would provide an additional benchmark for comparison—that benchmark would take as 
given the need to do a regulation in a particular area, but would relax the assumption that all 
legal requirements would need to be met. So, for example, in the case of regulating mercury 
emissions from power plants, one might ask the question whether there is any regulation that 
would result in positive net benefits. At this point, we think OMB should focus on the simpler 
case where the benchmark is defining an alternative that maximizes net benefits and is legal.
11 
 
Recommendation 2: OMB should include a scorecard showing the number and percentage 
of final regulations that pass or fail a benefit-cost test based strictly on factors that can be 
quantified and expressed in monetary terms.
12  
 
OMB could provide valuable information by including a scorecard that estimated the 
economic efficiency of regulation over time and across individual regulations.
13 One approach is 
                                                           
11 In some cases, the unconstrained first-best net benefit maximization problem may be difficult to specify. For 
example, in the case of mercury emissions, should it be restricted to power plants? Furthermore, some might argue 
that such “first-best” estimates should be beyond the purview of OMB, since it needs to operate within legal 
constraints imposed by Congress. While this is true, first-best estimates can help inform decision makers about the 
overall efficiency of regulations. 
12 This scorecard should include all final, economically significant regulations. The time frame should be at least the 
past decade.  
13 See, e.g., Hahn and Dudley (2004). See also GAO (1998).  5 
   
 
to assess the fraction of regulations that would pass a strict benefit-cost test. A strict benefit-cost 
test is based on the quantified benefit and cost estimates and excludes unquantified benefits and 
costs.
14 To the extent possible, this test should include all costs and benefits that can be 
quantified. 
  Table 1 provides an overview of the fraction of regulations that pass a strict benefit-cost 
test based on data contained in this year’s report. We consider one-hundred and eleven 
economically significant regulations for which OMB provides some information on costs and 
benefits between October 1, 1992 and September 30, 2004.
15 We exclude from the calculation 
those regulations for which agencies did not present estimates for both costs and benefits.
16  We 
also exclude two regulations from the calculation because they have net benefits of zero, and 
therefore, neither pass nor fail.
17  
OMB did not always provide a single estimate for costs or benefits, but often presented a 
range. Where OMB presented a range, we treated the midpoint as the best estimate. When OMB 
provided a single estimate, we considered it to be the best estimate.  
The table shows that seventy-nine percent (88 of 111) of the major non-transfer rules 
with quantified costs and benefits would pass a benefit-cost test using best estimates based on 
OMB’s numbers. The other twenty-one percent would fail.
18  
One obvious question is how sensitive these results are to changes in assumptions about 
estimates. We explore this question by doing a bounding analysis. When OMB provided a range, 
                                                           
14 For a discussion of how a cost-benefit analysis can incorporate unquantified costs and benefits, see Arrow et al. 
(1996a).  
15 All of the regulations are non-transfer rules. Of the 45 major regulations implemented between October 1, 2003 
and September 30, 2004, 19 were transfer rules. For a description of the difference between transfer and non-transfer 
rules, see OMB (2005): “Of the 45 rules, 19 implemented Federal budgetary programs, which caused income 
transfers, usually from taxpayers to another group. Rules that transfer Federal dollars among parties are not included 
in the benefit-cost totals because transfers are not social costs or benefits. If included, they would add equal amounts 
to benefits and costs. The remaining 26 regulations were ‘social regulations,’ which may require substantial 
additional private expenditures as well as provide new social benefits.”   If included in the analysis, transfer rules 
would not pass a benefit-cost test because they add equal amounts to benefits and costs. For a discussion of the 
differences between transfer rules and non-transfer rules as they apply to regulatory analysis, see Hahn (1999). See 
also Eric Posner (2003) for a useful suggestion on how to improve agency analyses of transfer rules.    
16 For the most recent period, October 1, 2003 to September 30, 2004, agencies did not present estimates for costs 
and benefits for fifteen of the twenty-six “social” regulations. Seven of these fifteen were homeland security 
regulations for which benefits are difficult to quantify and monetize. If we had included the fifteen regulations in the 
analysis, and assumed 0 for benefits and costs where they were not quantified, eleven of the fifteen would have 
failed. Two migratory bird hunting regulations would have passed since they had positive benefits and unquantified 
costs. Two regulations did not have estimates for either benefits or cost, so they neither pass nor fail using this test.  
17 These two regulations are “Child Restraint System” and “Roadway Worker Protection.” 
18 In this case, two regulations, “Child Restraint System” and “Roadway Worker Protection” had net benefits of 
zero. We excluded these two regulations from the analysis since they neither pass nor fail.  6 
   
 
we used the maximum benefits and the minimum costs to generate our “best-case” and “worst-
case” scenarios. The best-case scenario couples the maximum benefit estimate with the 
minimum cost estimate. The worst-case scenario does just the opposite.  
Table 1 shows that, under the best case scenario, ninety-six of the one-hundred and 
eleven regulations have positive net benefits. Under the worst-case scenario, only sixty-eight out 
of one-hundred and eleven pass our strict benefit-cost test. Aggregate net benefits under all 
scenarios are positive and significant, a finding that is consistent with earlier work that examined 
the government’s numbers over a much longer time period.
19  The exclusion of several 
regulations with unquantified benefits may remove many regulations with negative net 
benefits.
20  
OMB’s numbers suggest that a significant fraction of rules over the period from October 
1, 1992 to September 30, 2004 may not yield positive net benefits, at least when considering 
those benefits and costs that can be quantified and expressed in monetary terms. A more detailed 
breakdown of those rules is provided in Table 2, which shows rules that pass or fail a benefit-
cost test under various assumptions and their net benefits. If rules do not pass a benefit-cost test 
under reasonable assumptions, or at least those deemed reasonable by a regulatory agency, both 
the agency writing the regulation and the OMB should explain why they were still implemented. 
If the numbers strongly suggest that a rule fails a benefit-cost test, OMB should consider arguing 
for its reform or elimination.
21  
Once it presents basic information on whether a regulation passes or fails a benefit-cost 
test based on point estimates, OMB should consider refining its analysis by getting better 
information on the distribution of benefits, costs and net benefits. This is consistent with its 
guidelines to agencies that ask for such information on distributions.
22 Agencies often do not 
                                                           
19 See, for example, Hahn (2000) showing that aggregate net benefits are positive under a wide range of assumptions 
for discount rate and value of a statistical life. His database includes 106 final regulations promulgated between 
1983 and 1996. This aggregation does not take into account that different regulations may be implemented in 
different years. We doubt that this would change the basic qualitative result about aggregate net benefits being 
positive.  
20 Hahn (2005) suggests that including such rules in a scorecard could motivate agencies to search for better 
estimates on benefits and costs. 
21 In these situations, OMB should consider unquantifiable benefits and costs as well. When suggesting the 
elimination or reform of a regulation in its report to Congress, OMB should explain why it expects the overall 
benefits not to exceed the costs.  
22 OMB (2003a), at 41: “Whenever possible, you should use appropriate statistical techniques to determine a 
probability distribution of the relevant outcomes. For rules that exceed the $1 billion annual threshold, a formal 
quantitative analysis of uncertainty is required. For rules with annual benefits and/or costs in the range from 100 7 
   
 
provide best estimates and ranges for benefits and costs, as illustrated in this year’s draft report. 
Furthermore, we are aware of only a few RIAs in which an agency has provided a probability 
distribution for benefits or costs.
23   With a distribution of net benefits for each regulation, OMB 
could present a more nuanced probabilistic analysis of the net benefits of regulation individually 
and in the aggregate. At a minimum, however, OMB should require that the agencies provide 
information on a point estimate and range for net benefits. Moreover, it should provide guidance 
on how to determine the range.
24    
 
Recommendation 3: OMB should request that all agencies report on the extent to which 
they comply with OMB’s guidelines for conducting regulatory analysis, and OMB should 
report the results in its annual report.
25  
 
Last year, we recommended that OMB issue a scorecard identifying the extent to which 
regulatory analyses comply with its guidelines for conducting regulatory analysis. OMB, 
however, has not yet implemented this recommendation. OMB should hold the agencies more 
accountable for the quality of their regulatory analyses and should request that agencies adhere to 
OMB’s guidelines for regulatory analysis. For example, in its guidelines for conducting 
regulatory analysis, OMB requests that agencies quantify and monetize estimates whenever 
possible.
26 This past year, of the twenty-six final major rules adopted, fifteen, or fifty-eight 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
million to $1 billion, you should seek to use more rigorous approaches with higher consequence rules.” See also 
OMB (2003a), at 18: “When benefit and cost estimates are uncertain, you should report benefit and cost estimates 
(including benefits of risk reductions) that reflect the full probability distribution of potential consequences. Where 
possible, present probability distributions of benefits and costs and include the upper and lower bound estimates as 
complements to central tendency and other estimates.” 
23 For example, the National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) for Particulate Matter RIA has a distribution 
of benefits and costs with a mean and standard deviation. It uses a normal distribution to estimate benefits. See 
Environmental Protection Agency, National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Particulate Matter, Regulatory 
Impact Analysis (Washington, D.C.: Environmental Protection Agency, 1997). This RIA is available on the AEI-
Brookings Joint Center’s website, http://www.aei-brookings.com/publications/index.php?tab=topics&topicid=68.  
We are not aware of any Regulatory Impact Analyses that have a probability distribution for net benefits.  
24 There may be large uncertainties in some of these distributions, but we prefer that they be made explicit where 
possible. See, e.g., Arrow et al. (1996b): “Available methods and data generally imply ranges of possible values of 
costs and benefits, not single numbers. Benefit-cost analysis contributes most to intelligent decisionmaking when 
those ranges are clearly described along with best estimates…If the decisionmaker wishes to introduce a ‘margin of 
safety’ into his decision, he should do so explicitly.” 
25 For OMB’s most recent guidelines for conducting regulatory analysis, see OMB Circular A-4, OMB (2003c).  
26 See OMB (2005, 3) (“During the past year, 11 “major” final rules with quantified and monetized benefits and 
costs were adopted…There were an additional 15 final “major” rules that did not have quantified and monetized 
estimates of both benefits and costs.”) 8 
   
 
percent, did not have quantified and monetized estimates of both benefits and costs. Although 
seven of these fifteen regulations were homeland security regulations for which benefits are 
difficult to quantify, this overall lack of quantification is problematic. It is difficult to determine 
the aggregate net benefits of regulation if more than half of the rule analyses do not provide 
benefits or costs.
27  
We propose that OMB ask the agencies to score their own regulatory analyses on a few 
simple criteria: whether the agency monetized or quantified costs and benefits, used the discount 
rates prescribed by OMB, considered alternatives, and provided both a best estimate and range of 
estimates for net benefits.
28 OMB should summarize the results from the scorecards in its annual 
report.  
OMB’s guidelines should apply to both executive and independent agencies.
29  In this 
year’s report, OMB provides a table showing whether independent agencies monetized costs and 
benefits for economically significant regulations issued between October, 2003 and September, 
2004.
30  OMB does not, however, provide any estimates of the costs and benefits of these 
regulations. In cases where the agencies have provided benefits or costs, OMB should publish 
these estimates and explain any uncertainties.
31  In cases where independent agencies have not 
supplied benefit or cost information, OMB should ask them to estimate benefits and costs in the 
                                                           
27 See OMB (2003a), at 26-27: “Sound quantitative estimates for benefits and costs, where feasible, are preferable to 
qualitative descriptions of benefits and costs because they help decision makers understand the magnitudes of the 
effects of alternative actions…You should monetize quantitative estimates whenever possible…If monetization is 
impossible, explain why and present all available quantitative information.”    
28 For a discussion of alternatives, see Hahn et al. (2000, 874-875): “Unfortunately, the agencies generally did not 
provide a significant analysis of alternatives in RIAs, even when the agencies conducted a quantitative analysis of 
the preferred option…This incomplete assessment of alternatives makes its difficult to assess whether the 
alternatives would actually be superior to an agency’s preferred policy, even when using an agency’s own 
assessment.” See, e.g., Hahn and Dudley (2004).  
29 In the Regulatory Right-to-Know Act, Congress does not specify which agencies OMB can review for its annual 
report. See Section 624 of the Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act of 2001, Public Law 106-554, 
31 U.S.C. 1105. OMB can and should review both independent and executive agencies for its annual report to 
provide a comprehensive overview of regulation. It is imperative that independent agencies follow the same 
guidelines for conducting regulatory analysis as executive agencies so that OMB can provide standardized estimates 
of benefits and costs for all economically significant regulations.  
30 OMB (2005). 
31 See Table 6, OMB (2004, 25). The table, based on GAO reports, shows that the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) monetized benefits and costs for one economically significant regulation: “Alternative Net 
Capital Requirements for Broker-Dealers that are Part of Consolidated Supervised Entities.”  The table also shows 
that the Federal Communication Commission monetized costs but not benefits for one economically significant 
regulation: “Promoting Efficient Use of Spectrum Through Elimination of Barriers to the Development of 
Secondary Markets.”  9 
   
 
same format that executive agencies estimate them.
32    Finally, OMB should describe the major 
rules for which the agency provides benefits and costs. For example, OMB lists the SEC rule, 
“Alternative Net Capital Requirements for Broker Dealers,” as having monetized benefits and 
costs. However, we do not know anything about the rule other than its title. At a minimum, OMB 
should describe the costs and benefits of major rules issued by independent agencies with the 
same level of detail as it does for executive agencies. 
 
Recommendation 4: Congress should require that all agencies comply with OMB’s 
guidelines for conducting regulatory analysis.  
 
We believe that it is important that regulatory analyses adhere to certain economic and 
scientific standards, such as quantifying and monetizing costs and benefits to the extent possible, 
using the discount rates prescribed by OMB, considering alternatives, and providing both a best 
estimate and range of estimates for net benefits. The guidelines issued by OMB were designed to 
help to achieve that goal. Unfortunately, the guidelines do not appear to have been enforced very 
well.
33 Furthermore, they do not currently apply to independent regulatory agencies.
34  
There are two policy options for having all relevant agencies comply with specific 
guidelines for doing economic analysis of regulations—one is to pass a law and the other is to 
issue a new executive order. Congress could pass a law requiring that the proposed regulations 
move forward only if OMB determines that an agencies’ Regulatory Impact Analyses meet 
                                                           
32 Independent agencies, such as the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC) recently issued significant regulations that could have benefited from benefit-cost analyses. The 
recent Securities and Exchange Commission decision requiring Proxy Voting Policies and Proxy Voting Records by 
Registered Management Investment Companies could have benefited from a regulatory impact analysis. See, e.g., 
Kroszner (2004) for an analysis of a proposed SEC rule governing the inclusion of nominees of significant 
shareholders in company proxy voting materials. Under Executive Order 12866, OMB can require independent 
agencies to summarize alternatives and preliminary estimates of anticipated costs and benefits for economically 
significant regulations. See Clinton (1993) for Executive Order 12866, § 4(c), which outlines “The Regulatory 
Plan”: “For purposes of this subsection, the term “agency” or “agencies” shall also include those considered to be 
independent regulatory agencies, as defined in 44 U.S.C. 3502(10). (1) As part of the Unified Regulatory Agenda, 
beginning in 1994, each agency shall prepare a Regulatory Plan (Plan)…The Plan shall be approved personally by 
the agency head and shall contain at a minimum: A summary of each planned significant regulatory action 
including, to the extent possible, alternatives to be considered and preliminary estimates of the anticipated costs and 
benefits.”    
33 See, for example, Figure 5 in Hahn et al. (2000, 875), suggesting that agencies often do not quantify the impacts 
of alternatives in RIAs.  
34 See OMB (2003c). OMB Circular A-4, providing guidelines to Federal agencies on the development of regulatory 
analysis, is addressed only to executive agencies. We recommend that, at the very least, OMB should address this 
circular to the heads of independent agencies as well.   10 
   
 
certain guidelines.
35 Congress should also stipulate that if OMB determines that an agency’s 
Regulatory Impact Analysis does not comply with those guidelines, OMB must return the 
proposed regulation to the agency until the analysis complies.
36  
A second alternative is for the President to draft a new executive order requiring all 
agencies to comply with the guidelines.
37  It is not immediately clear whether the President could 
have legal authority over independent agencies. The President, however, is entitled to remove 
members of independent agencies for “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.”
38 
At a minimum, the President can require documents to ensure that agency officials are acting 
efficiently and in a way that does not show neglect. Therefore, requiring the independent 
agencies to comply with OMB’s guidelines for conducting regulatory analysis seems to have a 
firm legal basis. Moreover, if agencies implement regulations without showing that the benefits 
exceed the costs, they might be thought to be acting “inefficiently,” and in a way that shows 
neglect of duty.
39   
A new executive order could help ensure that both executive and independent agencies 
followed OMB’s guidelines prior to implementing a regulation.
40 That order could have the same 
enforcement mechanism as we suggested for the law.
41  
 
                                                           
35 Congress could, for example, insert a provision in the Regulatory-Right-to-Know Act specifying that both 
independent and executive agencies are required to submit the costs and benefits of their regulations to OMB and 
comply with OMB’s guidelines.    
36 Time-sensitive regulations could be given an exception. In addition, if an agency explains why complying with a 
guideline is not possible, and OMB agrees with the agency’s assessment, OMB should allow the rule to move 
forward.  
37 A new Executive Order would be easier to implement, but a law passed by Congress would be more effective. For 
a more in-depth discussion of promoting agency compliance with OMB’s regulatory guidelines, see Hahn and 
Sunstein (2002). Hahn and Sunstein propose a new executive order that would require agencies to comply with 
OMB’s guidelines for regulatory analysis. Currently, OMB lacks the statutory authority to enforce its guidelines. On 
the other hand, the President has the authority, via executive order, to issue binding principles. For a general 
discussion, see Kagan (2001). If the President has that authority, he also has the authority to delegate that power to 
the Director of OMB, at least if he does so expressly via executive order.  
38 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §41; 29 U.S.C. § 661 (b).  
39 See Hahn and Sunstein (2002), at 41 (arguing that Presidential oversight of independent agencies is both legal and 
critical to ensuring rationality in regulation.)  
40 An executive order requiring that independent agencies follow OMB’s guidelines may violate the separation of 
powers between the executive and legislative branches. For a closer look at this problem, see Hahn and Sunstein 
(2002). For an analysis of the constitutional concerns raised by an agency with “complete independence from the 
President,” see Lessig and Sunstein (1994).  
41 While we believe that a law passed by Congress would be more effective at requiring all the agencies to comply 
with OMB’s guidelines, an executive order might be easier to obtain because it does not require approval of both 
houses of Congress. The executive order should also state the consequences to the agencies of not complying with 11 
   
 
Recommendation 5: OMB should provide guidelines for how the Department of Homeland 
Security should quantify and monetize the benefits of antiterrorism regulations.  
 
OMB should ask the agencies to analyze the costs and benefits of current antiterrorism 
regulations. Homeland Security regulations represented seven of the fifteen major rules 
implemented in the past year that did not have quantified and monetized estimates of both 
benefits and costs.
42  OMB could develop ways to measure the regulations’ effectiveness.
43  
While determining precise quantitative estimates of benefits is often difficult, some quantitative 
or qualitative description may be possible. At a minimum, agencies should try to bound estimates 
in a way that policy makers can determine if they are making reasonable investments. An attempt 
at measuring the net benefits of terrorism-related regulations will help policy makers and the 
public to compare the merits of different regulatory options and assess whether these regulations 
are meeting expectations.
44   
 
Recommendation 6: OMB should include a discussion of the costs and benefits of antitrust 
activities in its annual report.  
 
Antitrust policy can affect pricing, output, and entry decisions of firms, and therefore can 
be important for consumers and producers.
45 Yet, OMB does not consider antitrust policy in 
tallying the costs and benefits of federal regulation.
46  Hahn and Hird, by contrast, regard 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
OMB’s guidelines. For example, if an agency’s regulatory analysis does not comply with OMB’s guidelines, OMB 
shold have the right to return this regulation to the agency until the agency complies.  
42 See OMB (2005, 3) (“Seven of these 15 rules implemented homeland security programs where the benefits of 
improved security are very difficult to quantify and monetize.”) 
43 For some insights into measuring the effectiveness of a policy to counter terrorism, see Richard Posner (2004).  
44 For a discussion of how the government can effectively deal with the risk of terrorism, see O’Hanlon et al. (2002).  
45 See Shenefield and Stelzer, The Antitrust Laws: A Primer, at 8 (2001) for the origins and objectives of antitrust 
policy (“Where competition fails, government has two choices. It can either protect the consumer from market abuse 
by directly regulating the firm with monopoly power or restore the vigor of competition through antitrust 
enforcement that prevents competitors from conspiring to fix prices or individual firms from dominating markets.”)  
46 See OMB 1997 Report, Appendix, Summary of Public Comments: (“Some commenters, on the other hand, 
thought economic regulation included anti-trust enforcement…we did not make it clear that these types of activities, 
which may be viewed by some to be regulating economic activity, were not intended to be included in the 
“economic regulation” category because they do not directly regulate firms’ pricing, output, or entry decisions. For 
example, antitrust enforcement by the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission is not generally 
done through regulation.”) 12 
   
 
antitrust as regulation.
47 The costs and benefits of antitrust actions are coming under increasing 
scrutiny by academics.
48  
   The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and Department of Justice (DOJ) currently publish 
some data on the economic impacts of antitrust investigations. For example, they provide a few 
aggregate estimates of consumer savings from antitrust enforcement in their annual performance 
reports to Congress.
49 The FTC also publishes an excellent series of reports and working papers, 
including several that estimate the economic impacts of various antitrust cases.
50  The DOJ, in 
contrast, does not appear to do retrospective analyses of antitrust activities on a regular basis or 
publish them in one central location.
51 Although the FTC and DOJ’s websites and annual 
performance reports contain valuable information about antitrust activities, the agencies do not 
provide a good summary of the estimated costs and benefits.  
OMB should request that the FTC and DOJ provide it with annual cost and benefit 
estimates of selected antitrust activities where available.
52 OMB should then summarize this data 
in its regulatory report. In addition, it may be useful for OMB to publish guidelines for analyzing 
the costs and benefits of antitrust activities, similar to OMB’s Guidelines for the Conduct of 
Regulatory Analysis.
53  
                                                           
47 See Hahn and Hird (1991) (“Economic regulation, including antitrust, may produce social benefits when natural 
monopolies are regulated to stimulate competition or when firms are prevented from anticompetitive collusion and 
mergers. In a dynamic economy, however, the dollar amount of such economic efficiency benefits are thought to be 
small.”) 
48 The area is controversial. For a pessimistic view of the impact of some antitrust actions, see Crandall and Winston 
(2003). For more optimistic views, see Baker (2003) and Werden (2003).  
49 See Federal Trade Commission Performance Report, Fiscal Year 2003 under the Government Performance and 
Results Act (March 2004), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opp/gpra/prfy2003.pdf. See also Department of Justice’s 
FY 2003 Performance and Accountability Report, under the Government Performance and Results Act (January 
2004), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/annualreports/ar2003/p2sg2.htm. 
50  See the FTC’s working papers and reports from the Bureau of Economics, available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/be/econwork.htm. Many of the retrospective analyses are not cost-benefit analyses. For example, 
some address the market share or price changes post-merger or post-enforcement, and do not contain a cost-benefit 
analysis of the agency’s action (or inaction). The Bureau of Economics at the FTC also analyzes consumer 
protection regulations: See http://www.ftc.gov/be/ (“The Bureau helps the FTC evaluate the economic impact of its 
actions. To do so, the Bureau provides economic analysis and support to antitrust and consumer protection 
investigations and rulemakings.”)  
51 The Economic Analysis Group (EAG) within the antitrust division of DOJ is responsible for conducting economic 
analyses of DOJ’s antitrust activities. It should follow the Bureau of Economics’ model in publishing its analyses in 
a consolidated place on a website.  
52 We recognize the challenges in doing retrospective economic analyses for non-merger activities. However, 
retrospective analyses of mergers are often more easily done.  
53 For OMB’s Guidelines on the Conduct of Regulatory Analysis, see 
 http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars/a004/a-4.pdf.  13 
   
 
We believe that providing more cost and benefit information about FTC and DOJ’s 
antitrust activities in the OMB Report will increase the transparency of antitrust policy and could 
increase economic efficiency.
54 It could also encourage the FTC and DOJ to continue to 
document their investigations and do retrospective analyses.  
By requiring agencies to submit annual cost and benefit estimates to OMB, Congress can 
help improve agency discipline in documenting information from antitrust investigations. 
Congress should give the agencies some leeway in the actions they analyze—particularly 
because of the difficulties in doing such analysis.
55 Nonetheless, it should suggest that the agency 




Recommendation 7: OMB should facilitate the use of information markets to increase 
overall economic efficiency and to inform regulatory decision making. 
 
A fundamental problem with benefit-cost analysis in assessing new regulations is that it 
is usually done before the fact. It is ex ante as opposed to ex post. When doing analyses before 
the fact, it is difficult to predict the future values of key variables that could be affected by a 
policy. The analyst may need to forecast, for example, the net benefits of a regulation to reduce 
arsenic several years before any benefits are realized.
57   
We think that information markets could be used to estimate parameters that would be 
directly useful for doing a benefit-cost analysis. Information markets are markets for contracts 
that yield payments based on the outcome of an uncertain future event, such as the impact of an 
EPA air quality regulation on the incidence of lung cancer twenty years from now. An 
information market allows individuals to purchase contracts, using real money, that yield 
payments to their owners that depend on the uncertain outcome of a future event.
58 With the 
                                                           
54 If the information proves to be useful, the idea could be extended to other regulatory agencies that deal with 
antitrust. 
55 It can sometimes take years to gather the data to do a good study on the likely impacts of a merger.  
56 Many retrospective analyses address the outcome of agency inaction (i.e., mergers that the agencies did not block, 
but might have been close to the enforcement threshold).  
57 See discussion, infra §4, §5. 
58 For a useful definition of information markets, see Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2004), at 108: (“Analytically, these are 
markets where participants trade in contracts whose payoff depends on unknown future events.”  The literature also 
refers to these markets as “speculative markets” and “betting markets.” For a discussion of speculative markets, see 
Hanson (2003, revised) at 6: (“Most markets for stocks, bonds, currency, and commodities futures are called 14 
   
 
advent of the Internet, information markets are becoming more widespread. They are used in a 
number of contexts ranging from assessing the likelihood that the Federal Reserve will raise 
interest rates to assessing the odds that a particular presidential candidate will be elected.  
But how confident should we be in the results derived from information markets? We can 
be more confident in such results if we introduce information markets that allow people to profit 
from superior knowledge about the future.
59  
If there were an information market that suggested that the incidence of cancer would 
decrease by 10% with a particulate matter regulation, this estimate would in theory incorporate 
all publicly available information about that regulation’s effects.
60 Moreover, information from 
the prices in these markets is likely to dominate other forecasts if the information markets are 
designed well. 
OMB should consider encouraging regulatory agencies to facilitate the use of information 
markets that could provide information on the costs and benefits of regulation. It should also 
advise agencies on how to apply information markets to determine the economic impacts of 
regulations. At this point, the benefit-cost estimates derived from information markets should 
supplement, not replace, conventional regulatory analyses.  
    In order for OMB and the agencies to use information markets, they must be allowed to 
do so. There are, however, several regulatory hurdles to establishing such markets, largely 
arising from state prohibitions on Internet gambling. The authority for regulating many 
information markets should be shifted from the states to the federal government, and the federal 
government should implement a clear policy that would make it relatively easy to research and 





                                                                                                                                                                                           
speculative markets because they allow people to bet on future prices by buying or selling today in the hope of later 
reversing such trades for a profit.”) For a discussion of “betting markets” see Rhode and Strumpf (2004), at 127-142.  
59 See, e.g., Hanson  (2003, revised) (last visited: 7/15/04). See also Abramowicz (2004)  http://www.aei-
brookings.com/publications/abstract.php?pid=370 (last visited: 7/15/04).  
60 When we say the market may “know”, “believe” or “suggest,” we are referring to the knowledge and beliefs of 
speculators in the market, which will be reflected in the market price. In what follows, when we ascribe a view to 
the market, such as “the market expects,” we use this as a shorthand. 
61 For a more in-depth discussion of how to regulate information markets, see Hahn and Tetlock, A New Approach 
for Regulating Information Markets (2004b).  15 
   
 
This analysis critically reviews the draft of the Office of Management and Budget’s 
eighth report on the benefits and costs of federal regulation. The draft report offers two modest 
improvements over previous reports. OMB includes a discussion of information quality and its 
importance to regulatory analysis for the first time. It does not, however, describe the impact that 
the Information Quality Act has had on the quality of regulatory analysis. Another improvement 
is OMB’s discussion of the differences between ex ante benefit-cost estimates and ex post 
benefit-cost estimates. While such a comparison is useful, there are many things OMB could do 
now to substantially improve the quality of agency analyses of regulation.  
  We offer seven recommendations—six for OMB and one for Congress—that would help 
hold regulators and lawmakers more accountable for the regulations they produce. Our 
recommendations focus on getting the regulatory agencies to produce better analysis, making 
that analysis more transparent and readily available, and making the regulatory process itself 
more transparent.    
  Finally, while we feel that many of the additions to this and previous reports have value, 
OMB should focus on a few critical components of the report. The most important, in our view, 
is to obtain accurate assessments of the costs and benefits of major individual federal regulations 
and viable alternatives to those regulations. With such information, decision makers and 
interested parties will be in a better position to gauge the effectiveness of the federal regulatory 
process.  
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                  Major Rules Passing a Strict Benefit-Cost Test
1  
                        (n=111)     
      




2  88   79%  $234 billion 
Best-case scenario
3  96  86%  $362 billion 
Worst-case scenario
4  68   61%  $106 billion 
          
1This benefit-cost test subtracts quantified costs from quantified benefits. The analysis includes one-hundred and thirteen non-
transfer rules described in the OMB’s report that were finalized between October 1, 1992 and September 30, 2004. Two regulations 
of the one-hundred and thirteen, “Child Restraint System” and “Roadway Worker Protection,” had net benefits of zero. We 
excluded them from the pass/fail test analysis because they neither pass nor fail.  
2 When the OMB presents a single estimate, we take that as the best estimate. When only a range is provided, 
we take the mid-point for costs or benefits as the best estimate.  
 
3 When a range is provided, this scenario uses the maximum benefits and minimum costs.   
4 When a range is provided, this scenario uses minimum benefits and maximum costs. 
5 Total annualized net benefits are the sum of annualized net benefits for all one-hundred and thirteen regulations. Annualized net 
benefits for each regulation equals the annualized benefits of the regulation minus the annualized costs, as reported by the OMB. 
Numbers are rounded to the nearest billion 2001 dollars. These calculations do not adjust for the fact that regulations are




Table 2  
Net Benefits of Major Rules ($2001 M) (1992-2004)
1 
Regulation Year Agency Best  Estimate  Pass? 
Bar Code Label Requirements for Human Drug Products  03-'04  HHS  3700  Yes 
Declaring Dietary Supplements  03-'04  HHS  17  Yes 
Standard Unique Health Care Provider  03-'04  HHS  56  Yes 
Pipeline Integrity Management  03-'04  DOT  -134  No 
Reduced Vertical Separation Minimum  03-'04  DOT  260  Yes 
Control of Emissions from Nonroad Diesel Engines  03-'04  EPA  31791  Yes 
NESHAP Boilers  03-'04  EPA  20357  Yes 
NESHAP Plywood  03-'04  EPA  572  Yes 
NESHAP Stationary Reciprocating Internal Combustion  03-'04  EPA  318  Yes 
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System  03-'04  EPA  -311  No 
Effluent Guidelines and Standards for Meat and Poultry  03-'04  EPA  -44  No 
Truck Driver Hours of Service  02-'03  DOT  -628  No 
Light Truck CAFÉ for Model Years '05-'07  02-'03  DOT  35  Yes 
National Pollutant Discharge Permits  02-'03  EPA  -81  No 
Patent Listing Requirements for Generics  02-'03  FDA  216  Yes 
Trans Fat Labeling  02-'03  FDA  1517  Yes 
Control of Listeria Monocytogenes in Meat and Poultry  02-'03  USDA  81  Yes 
Energy Conservation Standards for Central Acs  01-'02  DOE  74  Yes 
Tire Pressuring Monitoring Systems  01-'02  DOT  -301  No 
Control of Emissions from Nonroad Large Spark Ignition 
Engines 01-'02  EPA  2842  Yes 
Roadless Area Conservation  00-'01  USDA  -184  No 
Energy Conservation Standards for Fluorescent Lamps  00-'01  DOE  210  Yes 
Energy Conservation Standards for Water Heaters  00-'01  DOE  170  Yes 
Energy Conservation Standards for Clothes Washers  00-'01  DOE  1210  Yes 
Health Insurance Reform: Standards for Electronic 
Transactions  00-'01 HHS  2020  Yes 
Safe and Sanitary Processing and Importing of Juice  00-'01  HHS  120  Yes 
Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health 
Information 00-'01  HHS  1020  Yes 
Labeling of Shell Eggs  00-'01  HHS  246  Yes 
Safety Standards for Steel Erection  00-'01  DOL  89  Yes 
Advanced Airbags  00-'01  DOT  -330  No 
Identification of Dangerous Levels of Lead  00-'01  EPA  1595  Yes 
                                                           
1 We subtract OMB’s monetized costs from its monetized benefits. This analysis consists of one-hundred and thirteen non-
transfer rules described in OMB’s report that were finalized between October 1, 1992 and September 30, 2004.  
2  Period indicates the time frame in which the regulation was implemented. 1992 indicates the period between October 1, 
1992 and September 30, 1993. 1993 indicates the period between October 1, 1993 and September 30, 1994. 1994 is the 
period between October 1, 1994 and March 31, 1995. 1995 is the period between April 1, 1995 and March 31, 1996. 1996 is 
the period between April 1, 1996 and March 31, 1997. 1997 is the period between April 1, 1997 and March 31, 1998. 1998 is 
the period between April 1, 1998 and March 31, 1999. 1999 is the period between April 1, 1999 and March 31, 2000. 2000 is 
the period between April 1, 2000 and September 30, 2001. 2001 is the period between October 1, 2001 and September 31, 
2002. 2002 is the period between October 1, 2002 and September 30, 2003. 2003 is the period between October 1, 2003 and 




Arsenic and Clarifications  00-'01  EPA  -37  No 
National Emissions Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants 00-'01  EPA  311  Yes 
Heavy-Duty Engine and Vehicle Standards  00-'01  EPA  10600  Yes 
2004 and Later Model Year Highway Heavy Duty Engines  00-'01  EPA  6763  Yes 
Lead-Based Paint Hazards  99-'00  HUD  40  Yes 
Storm Water Discharges Phase II  99-'00  EPA  200  Yes 
Tier 2 Motor Vehicle Emission Standards  99-'00  EPA  6350  Yes 
Regional Haze  99-'00  EPA  2700  Yes 
Handheld Engines  99-'00 EPA  310  Yes 
Education of Children with Diabilities  98-'99  Dept. Ed.  249  Yes 
Safety and Effectiveness of New Drugs in Pediatric Patients  98-'99  HHS  33  Yes 
Over-the-Counter Drug Labeling  98-'99  HHS  58  Yes 
Provision of Transplant-Related Data  98-'99  HHS  938  Yes 
Powered Industrial Truck Operator  98-'99  DOL  217  Yes 
Lighting Devices, Reflectors, and Electrical Equipment  98-'99  DOT  21  Yes 
Child Restraint Anchorage Systems/Child Restraint System  98-'99  DOT  0  N/A 
Stage 1 Disinfectants/Disinfection Byproducts  98-'99  EPA  1373  Yes 
Enhanced Surface Water Treatment  98-'99  EPA  706  Yes 
Nitrogen Oxide Emission from New Steam Generators  98-'99  EPA  -16  No 
Volatile Organic Compound Emission Standards  98-'99  EPA  155  Yes 
Non-Road Diesel Engines  98-'99  EPA  2260  Yes 
Regional Transport of Ozone 98-'99  EPA  1243  Yes 
New Non-Road Non-Handheld Engines  98-'99  EPA  396  Yes 
Environmental Quality Incentives  97-'98  USDA  102  Yes 
Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network  97-'98  HHS  271  Yes 
Quality Mammography Standards  97-'98  HHS  226  Yes 
Respiratory Protection  97-'98  DOL  1723  Yes 
Energy Conservation Standards for Refrigerators  97-'98  DOE  531  Yes 
Energy Conservation Standards for Room Air Conditioners  97-'98  DOE  68  Yes 
Emission Standards for New Locomotives 97-'98  EPA  548  Yes 
Emission Standards for New Highway Engines  97-'98  EPA  525  Yes 
Pulp and Paper: Effluent Guidelines  97-'98  EPA  -136  No 
Pulp and Paper: NESHAP  97-'98  EPA  -62  No 
NAAQS Ozone  97-'98  EPA  -2220  No 
NAAQS Particulate Matter  97-'98  EPA  20340  Yes 
Disposal of PCBs  97-'98  EPA  521  Yes 
Conservation Reserve Program  96-'97  USDA  1390  Yes 
Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points  96-'97  USDA  1497  Yes 
Food Nutrition Labeling: Small Business Exemption  96-'97  HHS  388  Yes 
Restriction on the Sale and Distribution of Tobacco  96-'97  HHS  11605  Yes 
Medical Devices: Quality Regulations  96-'97  HHS  237  Yes 
Exposure to Methylene Chloride  96-'97  DOL  -23  No 
Airbag Depowering  96-'97  DOT  -96  No 
Roadway Worker Protection  96-'97  DOT  0  N/A 
Accidental Release Prevention  96-'97  EPA  79  Yes 




Deposit Control Gasoline  96-'97  EPA  96  Yes 
Acid Rain Phase II Nox Controls  96-'97  EPA  1158  Yes 
Federal Test Procedure Revisions 96-'97  EPA  249  Yes 
Voluntary Standards for Light-Duty Vehicles  96-'97  EPA  -28  No 
Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points: Seafood  95-'96  HHS  79  Yes 
Head Impact Protection  95-'96  DOT  1266  Yes 
Vessel Response Plans  95-'96  DOT  -271  No 
Marine Tank Vessel Loading and Petroleum Refining NESHAP  95-'96  EPA  367  Yes 
Air Emissions from Muncipal Solid Waste Landfills  95-'96  EPA  40  Yes 
Municipal Waste Combustors  95-'96  EPA  124  Yes 
Double-Hull Standards  94-'95  DOT  -566  No 
Stability Control of Medium and Heavy Vehicles During Braking 94-'95  DOT  1401  Yes 
Oil and Gas Extraction  94-'95  EPA  47  Yes 
Refueling Emissions from Light-Duty Vehicles  94-'95  EPA  431  Yes 
Non-Road Compression Ignition Engines  94-'95  EPA  1886  Yes 
Bay/Delta Water Quality Standards 94-'95  EPA  -129  No 
Deposit Control Gasoline  94-'95  EPA  848  Yes 
Occupational Exposure to Asbestos  93-'94  DOL  -356  No 
Controlled Substances and Alcohol Use  93-'94  DOL  1425  Yes 
Prevention of Prohibited Drug Use in Transit Operations  93-'94  DOT  70  Yes 
Phase II Land Disposal Restrictions  93-'94  EPA  -230  No 
Phase-out of Ozone-Depleting Chemicals  93-'94  EPA  946  Yes 
Reformulated Gasoline  93-'94  EPA  -755  No 
Acid Rain Nox, Title IV CAAA  93-'94  EPA  2143  Yes 
Hazardous Organic NESHAP 93-'94  EPA  1297  Yes 
Non-Road Compression Ignition Engines  93-'94  EPA  2370  Yes 
Nutrition Labeling of Meat and Poultry  92-'93  USDA/FSIS  177  Yes 
Food Labeling  92-'93  HHS/FDA  1334  Yes 
Real Estate Settlement Procedures  92-'93  HUD  160  Yes 
Manufactured Housing Wind Standards  92-'93  HUD  40  Yes 
Permit Required Confined Spaces  92-'93  DOL/OSHA  290  Yes 
Vessel Response Plans  92-'93  DHS/USCG  -286  No 
Acid Rain Permits Regulations  92-'93  EPA  77140  Yes 
Vehicle Inspection and Maintenance 92-'93  EPA  13  Yes 
Evaporative Emissions from Light-Duty and Heavy-Duty 
Vehicles  92-'93 EPA  542  Yes 
Onboard Diagnostic Systems  92-'93  EPA 1837 Yes 
   Total 234,161 
88 
Pass 
 Sources: OMB (2005), OMB (2004), OMB (2003a), OMB (2000)  
 
 